The Mercy for Children Act

FAQ: The Mercy for Children Act and Juvenile Sentencing in Florida

Q. What is the Mercy for Children Act, and who is behind it?

A. The Mercy for Children Act is a proposed amendment to Florida's criminal sentencing statutes aimed at ensuring equal treatment for all juvenile offenders. It's the pilot project of Freedom Force Florida (FFF), founded by Randolph "Randy" Baggett, a parole-eligible juvenile offender. The act seeks to retroactively apply current sentencing guidelines, providing judicial review to those previously sentenced under old parole standards.

Q. Why is the Mercy for Children Act needed?

A. The Act is needed to correct what its proponents describe as a fundamental injustice: juvenile offenders sentenced under older statutes are subject to parole review processes that effectively guarantee they will die in prison, often with a "presumptive parole release date" set for the distant future - sometimes more than a century after their sentencing. In contrast, juvenile offenders sentenced under newer judicial review systems have a chance for release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation, creating a significant disparity in outcomes for those who committed similar crimes.

Q. What is the key difference between parole review and judicial review for juvenile offenders in Florida?

A. Parole review, under older sentencing statutes, heavily weighs the seriousness of the crime and the offender's past record. This often results in extremely long presumptive parole release dates, effectively life sentences. Judicial review, established more recently, involves a hearing where the judge considers the offender's maturity, rehabilitation, and risk to society. If the juvenile demonstrates rehabilitation, the judge must release them on probation. This provides a more individualized assessment and a real opportunity for release.

Q. How does the Mercy for Children Act propose to fix the unequal treatment of juvenile offenders?

A. The Mercy for Children Act proposes to amend s.921.1402(1), Florida Statutes, so that the current judicial review process applies retroactively to all juvenile offenders. This would mean that all juvenile offenders, even those who were initially sentenced under the older parole system, would be eligible for a judicial review hearing where their individual circumstances are considered. Those who are on parole when the Act takes effect would be placed on probation. The change would go into effect July 1, 2025.

Q. What legal precedents form the basis for the claim that current practices are unconstitutional?

A. The legal basis for the argument for sentencing reform stems primarily from a series of Supreme Court cases. Roper v. Simmons (2005) outlawed the death penalty for juveniles, citing the lack of full brain development in young people. Graham v. Florida (2010) forbade life without parole sentences for juveniles who committed non-homicide crimes, stressing the importance of an opportunity for release based on maturity and rehabilitation. Miller v. Alabama (2012) then prohibited mandatory life without parole sentences for all juvenile offenders, citing the need to consider youth and its attendant circumstances before sentencing.

Q. How did Florida initially respond to Graham and Miller rulings?

A. Rather than overhauling their parole system, the Florida legislature chose to enact a new sentencing framework for juvenile offenders (Chapter 2014-220). This framework included providing term-of-years sentencing options and provided for judicial review after a specified period, focused on demonstrated rehabilitation and maturity. However, the legislature's chosen approach to compliance with Supreme Court precedent did not extend to those previously sentenced under the old parole system, leaving a large class of juvenile offenders subject to what were described as virtual life sentences.

Q. Why is the concept of a "meaningful opportunity for release" so important, and why do proponents of the Act claim Florida's parole system doesn't provide it?

A. The concept of a "meaningful opportunity for release" is key because the Supreme Court ruled that sentencing juveniles to life without parole is unconstitutional, meaning that juvenile offenders must have a genuine chance to demonstrate rehabilitation and be released at some point during their life. Proponents of the Act argue that Florida's parole system is structured such that the factors and criteria it uses do not offer real consideration of a juvenile's growth and transformation.

Instead, the system is dominated by consideration of the severity of the initial crime, meaning that, in many instances, parole becomes functionally impossible no matter how rehabilitated a juvenile becomes. Even where a juvenile is technically eligible for parole, the likelihood that they will be released is extremely low.

Q. What does the dissenting opinion in the cases cited assert, and how does it relate to the Mercy for Children Act?

A. The dissenting opinions in cases like Michel v. State and Franklin v. State argue that Florida’s current parole system does not offer a meaningful opportunity for release as it does not appropriately consider the Miller factors for individualized consideration, namely, a juvenile offender’s immaturity, potential for rehabilitation, and other factors associated with youth.

Instead, a focus on the seriousness of the crime and the offender’s past record dominates, rendering parole unlikely. The dissents emphasize the importance of resentencing under Chapter 2014-220, which allows a court to consider youth-related mitigating factors and impose sentences that reflect rehabilitation potential. These dissenting opinions highlight the very problems that the Mercy for Children Act seeks to solve, by arguing for an expanded application of judicial review instead of relying on parole.

The Mercy for Children Act and Florida Juvenile Sentencing Reform: A Legal History

Introduction:

This briefing document analyzes a series of legal documents and a policy proposal regarding the sentencing of juvenile offenders in Florida. It focuses on the arguments for and against retroactive changes to sentencing, the role of parole, and the broader legal and ethical considerations involved. Key documents reviewed include: excerpts from the “Mercy for Children Act” proposal, the Florida Supreme Court cases Atwell v. State and Michel v. State, as well as Franklin v. State. These sources highlight the complex interplay between legislative intent, judicial interpretation, and the constitutional rights of juvenile offenders.

I. The Mercy for Children Act:

Purpose:

The Mercy for Children Act is a proposed amendment to Florida statutes designed to ensure equal treatment of juvenile offenders, particularly those sentenced before current sentencing guidelines were in place. The core aim is to extend current judicial review options to those who previously faced parole reviews.

Context:

Randy Baggett, founder of Freedom Force Florida, a parole-eligible juvenile offender, frames the need for the act, stating he and 174 others are "practically guaranteed to die in prison" without legislative action.

Problem Definition:

The Act points to a disparity between juvenile offenders sentenced under judicial review (average release age 51.3 years) and those under parole review (average release age 92.6 years). This difference is deemed unjust, violating "equal protection of the law." The Act argues that similar crimes should receive similar punishments, regardless of the date of commission.

Proposed Solution:

• Retroactive Application: The amendment seeks to apply current judicial review statutes retroactively to all juvenile offenders, making those eligible for parole also eligible for judicial review.
• Ineligibility for Parole: Juvenile offenders seeking judicial review would become ineligible for parole.
• Probation after Release: Those released under judicial review would be placed on at least 5 years of probation.

Call to Action:

The act urges Florida residents to contact legislators and those out of state to boycott Florida, to pressure the state to reform juvenile sentencing.

"There are 175 parole-eligible juvenile offenders who will almost certainly die in prison if you don't help."

II. Legal History & Key Supreme Court Cases:

Roper v. Simmons (2005):

The U.S. Supreme Court outlawed the death penalty for juvenile offenders, citing scientific evidence of incomplete brain development in children, especially in areas of “foresight, risk analysis, [and] impulse control.” This ruling acknowledges that children are “physiologically incapable of making responsible, adult-like decisions.”

Graham v. Florida (2010):

The court extended the Roper reasoning to juvenile offenders sentenced to life without parole (LWOP) for non-homicide crimes. Since LWOP ensures a person dies in prison, the court equated it to the death penalty for juvenile offenders committing non-homicide crimes. Juvenile offenders committing non-homicide crimes must be given "a meaningful opportunity for release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”

"For a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide, the Eighth Amendment forbids the sentence of life without parole."

Miller v. Alabama (2012):

The court extended its reasoning further, banning mandatory LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders, even those convicted of homicide. The Court reasoned that judges must consider a juvenile’s “youth and attendant characteristics” before handing out a sentence.

"[T]he Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders."

Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016):

The Court clarified that Miller applies retroactively. Furthermore, it emphasized that it requires juvenile offenders to be given an opportunity to show their crimes do not reflect "irreparable corruption" but rather a "transient immaturity" and, thus, “their hope for some years of life outside prison walls must be restored.”

III. Atwell v. State (2016):

Facts:

Angelo Atwell was sentenced to a mandatory life term with the possibility of parole after 25 years for first-degree murder committed when he was 16. His presumptive parole release date was set to the year 2130, essentially ensuring he would die in prison.

Ruling:

The Florida Supreme Court ruled that Atwell's sentence was unconstitutional because, although technically parole-eligible, Florida's parole system did not provide for the individualized consideration of his juvenile status as required by Miller. The system heavily favored the severity of the offense over other mitigating factors like youth and rehabilitation.

Key Findings:

• Florida’s existing parole system, per statute, fails to offer “individualized sentencing consideration” for juvenile offenders.
• The court emphasized the spirit of Graham and Miller over a literal interpretation and that "youth matters for purposes of meting out the law's most serious punishments."
• The Court noted that the Florida Legislature created a new sentencing scheme to account for the Supreme Court’s ruling, specifically for juvenile offenders.

"The current parole process similarly fails to take into account the offender's juvenile status at the time of the offense, and effectively forces juvenile offenders to serve disproportionate sentences of the kind forbidden by Miller."

Outcome: Atwell was granted resentencing under the new sentencing framework (chapter 2014-220, laws of Florida), which mandated consideration of youth-related factors and judicial review.

IV. Michel v. State (2018):

Facts:

Budry Michel received a life sentence with the possibility of parole after 25 years for first-degree murder committed at age 16. He sought resentencing based on the Atwell ruling.

Ruling:

The Florida Supreme Court reversed the Fourth District Court of Appeals and approved the Fifth District's conflicting decisions, ultimately holding that sentences of life with the possibility of parole after 25 years do not violate the Eighth Amendment per Graham, Miller, and Virginia v. LeBlanc. Therefore, juvenile offenders with this type of sentence are not entitled to resentencing under section 921.1402, Florida Statutes. The Court effectively walked back its decision in Atwell.

Key Findings:

• The Court held that Graham and Miller only required “a meaningful opportunity for release,” not a guarantee of release.
• The Court relied heavily on Virginia v. LeBlanc, which held that a geriatric release program (which employed normal parole factors) could satisfy Graham.
• The Court reasoned that Florida’s parole system after 25 years of incarceration includes the “individualized considerations” that Miller spoke of and the state’s parole decisions are subject to judicial review.

"The United States Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment precedent regarding juvenile sentencing requires a mechanism for providing juveniles with an opportunity for release based upon their individual circumstances, which is not a standard aimed at guaranteeing an outcome of release for all juveniles regardless of individual circumstances that might weigh against release."

Dissent:

Justice Pariente, joined by Quince and Labarga, dissented, arguing that Atwell was binding precedent and that Florida's parole system did not adequately take into account Miller factors. Furthermore, the dissenting opinion noted that, in reality, Florida’s parole commission does not adequately consider the maturity and rehabilitation of the individual.

"Michel is left with the distinct possibility that he will spend the rest of his life in prison under a parole system that, as we painstakingly explained in Atwell, does not take into consideration any of the constitutionally required Miller factors when determining whether a juvenile offender should be released from prison."

V. Franklin v. State (2018):

Facts:

Arthur O’Derrell Franklin committed non-homicide crimes at 17 and received 1,000-year concurrent sentences with parole. He sought resentencing in light of the Supreme Court cases and was denied.

Ruling:

The Florida Supreme Court, guided by Virginia v. LeBlanc, upheld the First District Court of Appeal decision to deny his motion for resentencing, stating that his sentence did not violate the categorical rule of Graham.

Key Findings:

• The court reiterated its decision in Michel, stating that Florida's parole system meets the requirements of Graham in that the system gives the opportunity for a meaningful parole review.

"As we held in Michel, involving a juvenile homicide offender sentenced to life with the possibility of parole after 25 years, Florida’s statutory parole process fulfills Graham’s requirement that juveniles be given a “meaningful opportunity” to be considered for release during their natural life based upon “normal parole factors."

Dissent:

Justice Pariente dissented again, asserting that Franklin's presumptive parole release date of 2352 is a virtual life sentence without the possibility of release and thus violates the constitution as it doesn't provide "a meaningful opportunity for release." Furthermore, Justice Pariente argued that the court should remand the case for an evidentiary hearing, with Franklin represented by counsel, to determine whether the current parole system, as applied in the case, meets constitutional requirements.

VI. Key Themes and Conflicts:

• Judicial vs. Parole Review: The core debate revolves around the adequacy of Florida's parole system versus the more individualized approach offered by judicial review.
• Meaningful Opportunity for Release: The interpretations of “meaningful opportunity for release” diverge. The majority view after LeBlanc seems to require only parole eligibility and a review that considers "normal parole factors," while the dissenting view emphasizes the need for individualized consideration of youth, maturity, and rehabilitation and a genuine possibility of release within an inmate's lifetime.
• Stare Decisis: Justice Pariente’s dissenting opinions repeatedly emphasize the importance of stare decisis and argue that, in relying on LeBlanc, the majority improperly ignores this Court’s binding precedent.
• Retroactivity and Equal Protection: The Mercy for Children Act and arguments presented in Atwell stress that the retroactivity of Miller should apply broadly to remedy past sentencing disparities. This aligns with the arguments for “equal protection under the law” and the view that treating similarly situated offenders differently based on their sentencing date is fundamentally unfair.

VII. Conclusion:

These documents highlight the ongoing legal and moral challenges in addressing juvenile sentencing reform. While the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Michel v. State seems to have settled the question of whether the current parole system meets constitutional requirements, the dissenting arguments and the proposed Mercy for Children Act emphasize the need for more fundamental reform that addresses inherent inequalities of the old sentencing framework and provides meaningful opportunities for release based on maturity and rehabilitation of offenders. Ultimately, the debate highlights the tension between upholding the rule of law and ensuring fair and equitable treatment for juvenile offenders.

In 2021, the Juvenile Law Center of Philadelphia, PA, and Holland & Knight, one of Florida's premier law firms, filed a federal class-action lawsuit against the parole commission, alleging again that Florida's parole system failed to provide juvenile offenders the "meaningful opportunity for release" required by the U.S. Supreme Court. The federal district court summarily denied it in February of 2023. They appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Atlanta, but there is little hope of victory. The Eleventh Circuit is one of the least receptive courts in the nation regarding criminal justice reform. That's where we are today. Legislative reform is our only meaningful hope.

Juvenile Sentencing in Florida:
Does Parole-Eligibility Provide a Meaningful Opportunity for Release?

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